We introduce increasing returns to scale into an otherwise standard New Keynesian model with capital, and study the determinacy and E-stability of equilibrium under Taylor-type interest rate rules. With very mild increasing returns supported by empirical research, the conventional wisdom regarding the design of interest rate rules can be overturned. In particular, the "Taylor principle" no longer guarantees either determinacy or E-stability of the rational expectations equilibrium.
Introduction
It is well-known that self-ful…lling expectations may cause business ‡uctuations if there are certain types of coordination failures in the markets. In the real business cycle (RBC) literature, researchers emphasize the importance of increasing returns in generating such ‡uctuations (Farmer and Guo, 1994) . Increasing returns are usually originated from externalities or monopolistic competitions. Coordination failures also have important implications for economic agents who do not possess rational expectations and try to learn about the economic structure adaptively. The rational expectations equilibrium (REE) may not be "expectationally-stable" (E-stable) under learning (Du¤y and Xiao, 2003 and McGough, 2005) . The recent literature of monetary policy design, however, emphasizes the role of interest rate policies in either facilitating or restraining ‡uctuations caused by self-ful…lling expectations or E-instability. It is believed that if an interest rate policy is properly designed, it leads the economy to a determinate (free from self-ful…lling ‡uctuations) and E-stable REE (Bullard and Mitra, 2002) . Determinacy and E-stability have undoubtedly become two crucial criteria in evaluating monetary policies (Evans and Honkapohja, 2003) .
Interestingly, when selecting the proper interest rate rules to prevent excess volatilities, researchers prefer to condition on an economic environment that is free from any market coordination failures. In other words, the possibility that indeterminacy and E-instability come from a source other than inappropriate policies has been largely neglected. For example, there are extensive studies of the potential bene…ts and risks associated with Taylor-type interest rate rules. Yet when specifying the economic environment for these studies, researchers seem to ignore the possibility of increasing returns, which are known to cause indeterminacy and E-instability. The workhorse for this area -the New Keynesian model, has monopolistic competitions, staggered prices, but constant returns to scale. Since increasing returns are widely believed to occur in monopolistically competitive economies, one naturally wonders how robust the current …ndings are if the assumption of constant returns to scale does not hold. Indeed, to some researchers, one is "required" to postulate increasing returns in a monopolistic competition framework, since it is the "only way to account for the absence of signi…cant pure pro…ts in the United States economy" (Rotemberg and Woodford, 1995) . Therefore, incorporating increasing returns into the study of interest rate policy design seems the next logical step to take in extending this research.
In this paper, we propose a …rst step towards such an extension. We introduce increasing returns to scale into an otherwise standard New Keynesian model with capital, and study the determinacy and E-stability of equilirium under Taylor-type interest rate rules, as in Bullard and Mitra (2002) .
Bullard and Mitra's important …nding is that if the interest rate rule follows the so-called Taylor principle, the REE of the model is mostly likely both determinate and E-stable. The Taylor principle asserts that the monetary authority must adjust the short-term interest rate more than one-for-one with changes in in ‡ation. Our research question is: when there are increasing returns in the economy, how must the interest rate rules be changed to achieve a stable macroeconomic equilibrium? Does the Taylor principle still guarantee the determinacy and E-stability of the REE?
Our major …ndings are as follows. We re-examine the determinacy and E-stability of REE under four variants of the Taylor rule studied by Bullard and Mitra (2002) . The four variants are: 1. the contemporaneous data rule, 2. the lagged data rule, 3. the forward expectations rule, and 4. the contemporaneous expectations rule. Bullard and Mitra (2002) …nd that in most cases the Taylor principle is su¢ cient to guarantee both determinacy and E-stability. Moreover, with rule 1 and rule 4 a determinate REE is always E-stable and vice versa. We …nd that with small increasing returns that are consistent with empirical estimates, these …ndings no longer hold. In particular, the Taylor principle cannot guarantee either determinacy or E-stability with any of the four rules. In some cases, a less than one-for-one response of the interest rate to in ‡ation can lead to determinacy and E-stability. The policy implications are clear. To rule out indeterminacy and E-instability, it is critical for the monetary authority to identify the level of increasing returns -given a certain level of increasing returns, a distinct set of parameters for the interest rate rule will maintain the determinacy and E-stability of the REE.
The assumption of increasing returns to scale is widely considered in the business cycle and growth literature. 1 A major problem of models that possess indeterminate equilibria is that the required increasing returns are too high to live up to empirical tests. In empirical studies, the earlier work of Hall (1990) is known to have over-estimated the degree of increasing returns (larger than 1.5). More recent research …nd mild but signi…cant levels of increasing returns in the US economy.
For example, Fernald (1994 and 1997) out that certain topics can only be studied when capital is allowed to vary endogenously. 2 In our context, increasing returns in capital are known to have non-trivial e¤ects on the determinacy of the equilibrium. For example, Benhabib (1998) illustrates that self-ful…lling expectations about future investment returns are important in generating indeterminate equilibrium. Grandmont et al. (1998) show that the capital-labor substitutability a¤ects the robustness of sunspot equilibrium. Moreover, with endogenous capital, our model becomes a natural extension of Farmer and Guo (1994) , which ensures that the same mechanism that causes indeterminacy in their paper still exists in the New Keynesian framework. We therefore incorporate capital into the model in this study. We introduce capital in a standard way, as in Gali et al. (2004) . In our analysis, we compare a constant-return version of our model with Bullard and Mitra (2002)'s labor-only model to make sure that introducing capital alone does not alter the determinacy and E-stability of the REE. All changes in the REE properties are caused by incorporating increasing returns to scale.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the micro-founded model framework and derives the equilibrium conditions. Section 3 discusses the methodology and calibration of the model. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes.
A New Keynesian Model with Capital and Increasing Returns
This is a New Keynesian model with capital. Incorporating capital into a sticky price model is a relatively new topic, and economists have not reached any consensus on how capital should be introduced into the model, and to what extent it will change the determinacy and E-stability properties of the equilibrium. Therefore, before we formally lay out the model environment, we discuss this issue.
Modelling Capital
The standard neoclassical assumption for modelling capital is that households own the capital stock and rent it to …rms in a capital rental market in each period. 
Households
The economy is composed of a large number of in…nitely-lived consumers. Each of them consumes a …nal good C t , and supplies labor N t . Savings can be held in the form of real money balances
Mt
Pt , bonds B t , and capital K t . Consumers seek to maximize life-time utility
where ; ; b; v; > 0 and 0 < < 1. The random shock u t represents shifts in tastes that a¤ect the marginal utility of leisure. This is suggested by Clarida et al. (2001) as a means to incorporate a "cost-push" shock in the in ‡ation adjustment equation. The budget constraint is
and the capital accumulation equation is
Hence, the consumers receive real labor income (W t =P t )N t , and real capital rental income
is the quantity of riskless one-period bonds carried over from period t 1 which pay out interests at a nominal rate of 1 + i t 1 . D t are dividends from ownership of …rms. M t 1 =P t are real money holdings carried over from period t 1. The consumers spend their income on consumption C t , new money holdings M t =P t , new bond purchases B t =P t , and new investment I t .
Capital adjustment costs are introduced through the term (I t =K t )K t , which determines the change in capital stock induced by investment spending I t . We assume 0 > 0, and 00 0, with 0 ( ) = 1
and ( ) = as in Gali et al. (2004) .
The …rst order conditions for the consumer's problem can be written as
where t+1 = (I t+1 =K t+1 ) and
, respectively. Q t is the real shadow value of capital, i.e., Tobin's Q. This is de…ned as
Given our assumption about , the elasticity of the investment-capital ratio with respect to Q is
Firms
There exists a continuum of monopolistically competitive …rms producing di¤erentiated intermediate goods. The latter are used as inputs by perfectly competitive …rms producing a single …nal good.
Final Goods Producers
The …nal goods are produced by a representative, perfectly competitive …rm with a constant returns to scale technology
where y jt is the quantity of intermediate goods j used as an input, and " > 1 governs the price elasticity of individual goods. Pro…t maximization yields the demand schedule
which, when plugged back into (8), yields
Intermediate Goods Producers
The intermediate goods market features a large number of monopolistic competitive …rms. The production function of a typical intermediate goods …rm is
where K jt and N jt represent the capital and labor services hired by …rm j, and A t is a technology shock. The parameter measures the level of returns to scale. When = 1, the production technology reduces to the constant-return Cobb-Douglas production function. When > 1, the intermediate goods …rm has increasing returns to scale.
The …rms'real marginal costs ' jt is derived by minimizing costs:
which in turn implies the optimality condition
Note that when there are constant returns to scale, (12) and (13) imply that the real marginal costs ' c t are given by
which is equalized across all …rms since there is no j in the expression. When there are increasing or decreasing returns to scale, a …rm's real marginal costs are associated with its production levels.
In this case we can de…ne the average level of marginal costs as
Using (12), (13), and the demand schedule, we can relate the real marginal costs of a …rm ' jt to the average level of marginal costs ' t as
:
Intermediate …rms set nominal prices in a staggered fashion, according to the stochastic time dependent rule proposed by Calvo (1983) . Each …rm resets its price with probability 1 ! each period, independent of the time elapsed since the last price adjustment. A …rm resetting its price in period t seeks to maximize
where P t represents the (common) optimal price chosen by …rms resetting prices at time t.
Finally, the equation describing the dynamics for the aggregate price level is
Monetary Authority
The central bank sets the nominal interest rate i t every period according to a simple linear rule contingent on information about output and in ‡ation. Following Bullard and Mitra (2002), we consider four variants of the interest rate rule. The …rst variant is called the "contemporaneous data rule":
where 0 and y 0. This is the original Taylor rule that conditions the interest rate on current output and in ‡ation rate. 4 Since current data for output and in ‡ation may not be available at time t, some suggest a "lagged data rule":
The third rule is called "forward expectations rule":
where central bankers use the market's expectations about the future to set the interest rate. The fourth rule is called the "contemporaneous expectations rule":
where the underlined assumption is that the market does not have current data and attempts to use past data to estimate today's output and in ‡ation.
Equilibrium and Reduced Linear Systems
The following conditions clear the factors and goods markets:
We need to derive the linearized versions of the key optimality conditions in order to conduct our analysis. We use lower case letters to denote linearized variables. There are six non-dynamic equations and four dynamic equations. The …rst equation is the linearized version of the labor supply schedule (3):
The second equation is the linearized version of (7), which de…nes Tobin's Q:
where, to avoid confusion with the nominal interest rate, we have denoted investment by the letter x t . The third and fourth equations are the linearized versions of (12) . We are interested in the average level of marginal costs, which are given by
The …fth equation is the linearized production function
The sixth equation is the market clearing condition
where C, I and Y are steady state levels of consumption, investment and output.
The …rst dynamic equation is Phillips curve, which is derived by solving the …rm's dynamic price-setting problem and combining it with (18) . The equation is given by where =
The second dynamic equation is the linearized version of (6), which describes the evolution of Tobin's Q:
The third dynamic equation is the Euler equation (5), which can be linearized as
The last dynamic equation is the capital accumulation equation (2), which is linearized as
Finally, we add the interest rate rule and use the non-dynamic equations to substitute out seven variables q t , w t p t , r t p t , x t , i t , ' t , and y t . The system becomes a four dimensional linear di¤erence equation system consisting of s t = (c t ; n t ; k t ; t ) 0 and a vector of shocks t = (u t ; a t ) 0 .
We note that when researchers study the labor-only model, a convention is to convert all variables into "gaps" -the di¤erence between a lower-case variable and its ‡exible-price counterpart. When capital is added, it becomes very di¢ cult, if not impossible, to make such conversions. Therefore To study adaptive learning, we re-write the system as
where the second equation is derived from the capital accumulation equation that does not involve any expectations and does not need to be learned. We assume agents have the perceived law of motion (PLM)
5 With the lagged data rule, the interest rate rule itself is a dynamic equation with state variables t 1 and y t 1 . In that case we require two stable roots to yield determinacy. which is in the same form as the MSV solution under REE. The parameter vectors a, and f will have to be learned. Since the properties of the shock vector t is not essential to our result, we make a convenient assumption that the shock is white noise with mean 0. Given this PLM, we calculate the forward expectation of z t as E t z t+1 = a + E t k t+1 + 0 = a + E t (e z z t + e k k t ) = a + e z z t + e k k t :
Plugging this expression into (34), we obtain the T-mapping from (a; ; f ) 0 to combinations of the true parameters of the model. The model is E-stable if It is worth pointing out that the assumptions about agents'information set are crucial in determining the E-stability result. In the baseline case outlined above, we implicitly assume that both the private sectors and the central bank observe current values of the variable k t and the shock t . They use this information to obtain forecasts E t z t+1 and E t k t+1 , which in turn determine the current values of z t . This applies to the cases with the current data rule and the forward expectation rule. However, this is sometimes criticized as being unrealistic, since current data are usually not available to economic agents in real life. 6 An alternative assumption is to assume that the agents can observe current exogenous variables but only lagged values of the endogenous and state variables at time t. We apply this assumption to the cases with the lagged data rule and the contemporaneous expectations rule. Both the central bank and the private sectors are assumed to have symmetric knowledge of the lagged data. With these assumptions, we derive the speci…c E-stability conditions for each interest rate rule, and present them in the appendix.
Benchmark Calibration
The system (33) has four dynamic equations and four variables. We cannot obtain analytical solutions for either determinacy or E-stability. We therefore rely on numerical simulations to study the Inverse of labor supply elasticity Table 1 : Calibration properties of the equilibrium. Table 1 summarizes the values we used for the benchmark calibration.
Most parameters are chosen to conform with parameters used in the literature. For example, the discount factor is set at 0.99, the depreciation rate is set at 0.025, and the capital share in production is set at 1/3. The steady state mark-up is set at a mild level of 1.05, which implicitly de…nes a value for the elasticity of substitution across intermediate goods, ". The inverse of the elasticity of labor supply, , is set to 1. The curvature of the utility function is set to 1 so that the utility is in logarithm form. The fraction of …rms that keep their prices unchanged, !, is given a value of 0.75, which corresponds to an average price duration of about one year. The elasticity of investment with respect to Tobin's Q, , is set to 1, following King and Watson (1996) .
The weights for in ‡ation and output in the interest rate rule, y and , and the level of increasing
returns are left open so we can experiment with di¤erent values.
Determinacy and E-stability of Interest Rate Rules
In this section, we study the determinacy and E-stability of REEs under di¤erent interest rate rules.
Since the results for the four variants of the Taylor rule bear some similarities, our strategy is to closely examine the results for the contemporaneous rule, and then go over the results for the other three variants brie ‡y. To simplify exposition, we use the term "stable REE"to refer to an REE that is both determinate and E-stable, and the term "active policy"to refer to an interest rate rule that responds more than one-for-one to changes in in ‡ation.
Contemporaneous Data Rule
In this section we consider the interest rate rule (19):
A standard New Keynesian model does not have endogenous capital. Therefore our …rst question is whether or not adding capital alone will change the properties of the equilibrium. To answer this question, we do a side-by-side comparison of a model with capital and a model without. The latter is a special case of the model in section 2 and is essentially the same as in Bullard and Mitra (2002) . In both cases, the production function has constant returns to scale, and we keep all other parameters identical when necessary. We vary the policy weights for output (Y-axis) and in ‡ation (X-axis) and examine the properties of the REE for each combination of the parameters. The results are presented in Figure 1 . We use a dark-colored star "*" to indicate that an REE is both determinate E-stable, a square to indicate that an REE is determinate but not E-stable, and a light-colored circle "o" to indicate that an REE is explosive. We left indeterminacy areas blank.
The top panel of Figure 1 shows the REE properties of the model without capital. Not surprisingly, the results are identical to those of Bullard and Mitra (2002) . When the policy weight for in ‡ation is larger than 1, the REE is always determinate and E-stable. The Taylor principle therefore guarantees the uniqueness and stability of the REE. The lower panel of Figure 1 shows the results for the model with capital. We note that the stability area nearly coincides with that of the top panel. Most of the determinate and E-stable regions require an in ‡ation weight higher than 1. When the in ‡ation weight goes below 1, the required output weight must adjust upwards.
Moreover, a determinate REE must also be E-stable, and vice versa, since there is no region denoted by squares or circles. The Taylor principle undoubtedly still guarantees stability in this case. We hence conclude that adding capital alone basically does not change the equilibrium properties of the model. We reiterate that our result is consistent with those of Benhabib and Eusepi (2005) Next, we examine the e¤ect of increasing returns to scale. As a …rst step, we …x the policy parameters for output and in ‡ation to be 1.5 and 0.5, as originally proposed by Taylor, and increase the level of to see if the REE properties will change. We …nd that when is between 1 and 1.05, the REE remains determinate and E-stable. But when rises to 1.06, the system becomes indeterminate and E-unstable. This is a …rst hint that the Taylor principle might not lead to stable equilibria with increasing returns.
To examine the issue more closely, we next study how the policy parameters y and a¤ect the outcomes when increasing returns exist. We …x the level of increasing returns to be 1.09. We choose this number for the benchmark experiment because it is the lower bound of the recent value estimated by Laitner and Stolyarov (2004) , and is the upper bound estimated by Basu and Fernald (1994) . Other values will be examined shortly. The results are presented in Figure 2 .
The results are striking. With moderate increasing returns, the Taylor principle no longer guarantees stability: the area of indeterminacy and the area of determinacy and E-stability almost exactly reversed when compared with the constant-return case. While the area of determinacy and the area of E-stability still coincide, this area requires policy weights for in ‡ation that are mostly less than one. Contrary to previous studies, this suggests that an inactive monetary policy is appropriate in terms of stabilizing the equilibrium.
One naturally wonders how the area of stability shifted from the right to the left as the level of increasing returns changes. Next we plot a series of three graphs in Figure 3 to show the transition process. The level of returns to scale starts from 1.06 and increases at an increment of 0.01 in these graphs. We can clearly see that as increases, an area of indeterminacy and E-instability is created and gradually expands to the right and wipes o¤ the stability areas on the right. In the mean time, a stable area occurs on the left and slowly expands. The E-stability and determinacy areas always coincide with each other, as in the case of constant returns (there is no area of squares).
In Farmer and Guo (1994)'s original analysis of indeterminacy in an RBC model, the required level of increasing returns to generate indeterminacy quite high (more than 1.2). As we reported earlier, this required level is signi…cantly lower in our model (1.06 for the benchmark calibration).
The key di¤erence is that the new Keynesian model allows for price rigidity which links the real marginal cost with in ‡ation (equation 29). As Benhabib and Eusepi (2005) point out, this generates an additional "cost channel" that enhances the e¤ect of in ‡ation expectations on actual future in ‡ation, which makes these expectations more likely to become self-ful…lling than in the ‡exible price (or RBC) case.
In our simulation exercises, we also …nd that the steady-state level of markups, denoted by " " 1 , signi…cantly a¤ects the required levels of increasing returns to generate indeterminacy. In our benchmark study, we set the markup level to be 1.05. It turns out that if we lower the markup level, the REE is more likely to become indeterminate. We show this …nding in Table 2 , where all results are obtained by setting the policy weight for output to 0.5 and for in ‡ation to 1.5. When the level of markup is 1.03, for example, an increasing return of 1.04 is enough to generate indeterminacy.
When the level of markup is 1.11, the required level of increasing returns is 1.12. This suggests that if an economy has small markups, it is more likely for the REE to be unstable. The intuition Table 2 : Table Caption is straightforward: the steady-state markup level a¤ects the size of the reaction parameter 1+B in front of the real marginal cost in equation (29) . The higher the markup, the smaller this parameter.
A smaller reaction coe¢ cient for the real marginal cost reduces the impact of the "cost channel,"
which in turn requires a stronger level of increasing returns to generate self-ful…lling equilibria.
The series of results have important implications for policy making. First, it is no longer safe to implement the rule-of-thumb principle of reacting "more than one-for-one" to changes in the in ‡ation rates. As Figure 2 shows, when increasing returns are at a moderate level, the Taylor principle will exactly lead to an unstable equilibrium. Second, the designing of policy rules should condition heavily on the status (level of increasing returns) of the economy. The combinations of policy parameters that lead to determinate and E-stable vary as the level of increasing returns vary.
When is 1.06 (top panel of Figure 3 ), a strong response to in ‡ation combined with a weak response to output will almost always guarantee stability, but when is 1.09 (Figure 2 ), such a policy always leads to instability.
In the next three sections we show that similar results hold for the other three variants of the Taylor rule.
Forward Expectations Rule
We now turn to the interest rate rule (21):
Just as in the previous section, a …rst experiment shows that when = 1:06, the Taylor-suggested policy weights 1.5 for in ‡ation and 0.5 for output no longer guarantee stability. We therefore make a side-by-side comparison of two di¤erent REEs, one with constant returns, and the other with increasing returns ( = 1:09). The results are presented in Figure 4 .
The top panel of Figure 4 displays the results for the case of constant returns to scale. The plot is again almost identical to the no-capital case studied by Bullard and Mitra (2002) . While in general the stability area is smaller than the contemporaneous data case, a more than one-for-one response to in ‡ation combined with a moderate response to output still guarantee the determinacy and E-stability of the REE. The lower panel of Figure 4 displays the results for the increasing returns case. The conclusion is again reversed. With increasing returns, a less than one-for-one response to in ‡ation is required to obtain determinacy and E-stability of the REE. The smaller stability area compared with the contemporaneous data case shows that an expectation-based rule is in general less desirable.
Lagged Data Rule
We next examine the rule (20) :
We present the results in Figure 5 .
The top panel of Figure 5 shows the results for the constant returns to scale economy. With a lagged data rule, it is no longer true that a determinate REE is always E-stable. Instead, two new areas are introduced. The areas denoted by squares represent determinate equilibria that are not E-stable. The areas denoted by light circles represent REEs that are explosive. While stability seems harder to achieve, it is still true that the Taylor principle basically guarantees determinacy and E-stability, as long as the weight for output is mild enough. The lower panel shows the results for the increasing returns economy. As before, the small area of determinacy and E-stability violates the Taylor principle and requires a less than one-for-one response to in ‡ation. Active response to in ‡ation leads to either indeterminacy or explosive REEs.
Constant returns
Increasing returns: = 1:09 
Contemporaneous Expectations Rule
Lastly, we examine the economy with the rule (22):
The results are presented in Figure 6 . Bullard and Mitra (2002) believe that the contemporaneous expectations rule is both practical and desirable -practical because current data on output and in ‡ation are generally not available but can be estimated, and desirable because it guarantees stability when the policy weight for in ‡ation is larger than 1. This can be seen from the top panel of Figure 6 . The large area of stability resides to right of the area where is equal to 1. However, as we introduce increase returns, the conclusion no longer holds. As shown in the lower panel of Figure 6 , if we increase the level of to 1.09, the area of stability switches to the left, just as in the previous cases we studied. Now an active response to in ‡ation will only lead to indeterminate or E-unstable REEs.
Discussion
When increasing returns are introduced, implementing the Taylor principle often leads to indeterminacy and E-instability. What explains this puzzling result? The key is to understand the role of increasing returns in generating self-ful…lling business cycles.
When Benhabib (1998) …rst explains the intuition of indeterminacy, he uses the example of sunspot-driven investment booms. When agents expect higher investment returns, they increase investment and accumulate more capital. But with constant returns, the return of investment (marginal product of capital) decreases with more capital accumulation, and the expectations of higher returns will never be self-ful…lled. When increasing returns are high enough, however, more capital will actually increase the return of investment and ful…ll the earlier expectations. In our context, this implies that with constant returns, we have the standard increasing marginal cost curve; but with su¢ cient increasing returns, the …rms operates on the part of the marginal cost The rest of the intuition is straightforward. In our model, the monetary authority's job is to dampen any ‡uctuations driven by in ‡ation expectations. When consumers expect higher in ‡ations, the monetary authority responds by raising the nominal interest rate more than one-for-one with the expected in ‡ation rate. As a result, the real interest rate will rise, which in turn will curb the rise in aggregate demand. With lower demand and a standard marginal cost curve, …rms will cut their prices -an action that goes against the earlier expectations of high in ‡ation. This is why the Taylor principle leads to a determinate equilibrium with constant returns to scale. If the …rms operate on the decreasing part of the marginal cost curve, on the other hand, lower demand will actually lead them to increase prices, which exactly ful…lls the consumers' earlier expectations about high in ‡ation rates. This is why the Taylor principle leads to indeterminacy in the increasing returns case.
Interest Rate Smoothing
Interest rate smoothing has been proposed by the literature to be a desirable policy which is conducive to determinacy and E-stability in models without capital (Woodford, 2003, Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2000, and Bullard and Mitra, 2003) . In this section we extend our analysis to include this feature, and obtain some preliminary results. Our job is to examine if the Taylor principle can survive the test of increasing returns when policy smoothing is in the model. We consider the following policy rule:
where 2 (0; 1). We experiment with several di¤erent combinations of parameter values, particularly for and . Our general …ndings are as follows: with constant returns, the Taylor principle yields determinate REEs as long as the policy response to in ‡ation is not too strong (greater than 6.5% when = 0:5). Moreover, the higher the value for the smoothing parameter , the more likely the REE will also be E-stable under learning. This …nding is consistent with the current literature.
With increasing returns, the result is again reversed as in previous sections: the REE is more likely to be indeterminate and E-unstable when the reaction parameter for in ‡ation is greater than unity. We present a typical result in Figure 7 . We therefore conclude that the key mechanism we discussed in previous sections still prevails with policy smoothing.
Conclusion
This paper incorporates increasing returns into an otherwise standard New Keynesian model with capital. Within this framework, we re-examine the determinacy and E-stability of REE under four variants of the Taylor rule studied by Bullard and Mitra (2002) . While Bullard and Mitra (2002) …nd that in most cases the Taylor principle is su¢ cient to guarantee both determinacy and E-stability, we …nd that with small increasing returns that are consistent with empirical estimates, these …ndings no longer hold. In particular, some levels of increasing returns require a less-than-one-for-one response of the interest rate rule to in ‡ation to obtain determinacy and E-stability.
The results in this paper suggest that designing the interest rule is much more complicated than simply following a rule of thumb. In our context, a successful interest rule must condition on the level of returns to scale of the economy. There is no reason to believe that the returns to scale of the economy is constant over time. For example, when arguing about the existence of a "new economy," some researchers point out that the widespread usage of IT technology generates additional externality e¤ect that gives rise to increasing returns. Our results suggest that the monetary authority may well be required to adjust its policy with such changes to ensure market stability.
This paper suggests that the types of interest rate rules that can maintain the stability of the REE are di¤erent when there are market failures in the economy. Given this result, opportunities now exist for us to study other implications of increasing returns for monetary policy making. In particular, we wonder what e¤ect increasing returns will have when the monetary authority designs its interest rate rules by minimizing a cost function, either with discretion or with commitment. We leave this for future research.
Constant returns: = 0:5
Increasing returns: = 0:5, = 1:07 Table 3 : Properties of the REE with the interest rate smoothing rule. The areas of determinacy and E-stability are marked with dark stars. The Indeterminate areas are left blank. The determinate but E-unstable areas are denoted by squares.
Appendix
In this section we derive the E-stability conditions for all four variants of the interest rate rules. It is straightforward to show that the white noise shock t has no impact on the E-stability properties of the system. We therefore ignore this shock in the following calculations. We re-write the system as
k t+1 = e z z t + e k k t :
The second equation is derived from the capital accumulation equation that does not involve any expectations.
Contemporaneous Data and Forward Expectations Rules
With the contemporaneous data rule and the forward expectations rule, the information sets available for the learning agents are the same, therefore the E-stability conditions are similar. We assume agents have the perceived law of motion (PLM)
which is in the same form as the MSV solution under REE. The parameter vectors a and will have to be learned. Given this PLM, we calculate the forward expectation of z t as E t z t+1 = a + E t k t+1 = a + E t (e z z t + e k k t ) = a + e z z t + e k k t :
Plugging this into (36), we get where N = (I me z ) 1 and a and are evaluated at the steady state values.
Lagged Data Rule
With the lagged data rule i t = y y t 1 + t 1 ; the implicit assumption is that the agents do not possess knowledge of current data. Therefore the perceived law of motion must be di¤erent. If we plug the interest rate rule into the set of equilibrium conditions, the system becomes z t = F E t k t+1 + GE t z t+1 + Hk t 1 + Lz t 1 ; k t = e z z t 1 + e k k t 1 :
The PLM of the agents is z t = a + z t 1 + k t 1 :
Given this PLM, the T-mapping of parameters are derived as T (a) = F e z a + G( a + a);
T ( ) = F e z + F e k e z + L + G( 2 + e z );
T ( ) = F e z + F e
The key matrices that determine the E-stability property of the REE are 
Contemporaneous Expectations Rule
With the contemporaneous expectations rule i t = y E t 1 y t + E t 1 t ;
our implicit assumption about agents' information set is that they do not possess knowledge of current data, and have to use past data to estimate today's output and in ‡ation. We can substitute out the variable y t and re-write the interest rate rule as
The system can be re-written as
k t = e k k t 1 + e z z t 1 :
Plugging the PLM z t = a + k t 1 + z t 1 into the system, the system becomes z t = F E t 1 k t+1 + GE t 1 z t+1 + Hk t 1 + Lz t 1 + M a; k t = e z z t 1 + e k k t 1 :
Following the similar procedures, we derive the critical matrices as 
